





NO 658 / JULY 2006
THE RESPONSE OF FIRMS’ 
INVESTMENT AND 
FINANCING TO ADVERSE 
CASH FLOW SHOCKS
THE ROLE OF BANK 
RELATIONSHIPS
by Catherine Fuss
and Philip VermeulenIn 2006 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO 658 / JULY 2006
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=913332
1   The opinions expressed in this paper are solely our own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the National Bank of Belgium 
or the European Central Bank. We would like to thank Paul Butzen, Steven Ongena, Egon Zakrajsek, an anonymous referee and 
participants to the ECB workshop on „Corporate finance and monetary policy“, May 2006, for useful suggestions. 
2   National Bank of Belgium, 14, bd de Berlaimont, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; e-mail: catherine.fuss@nbb.be 
3   European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; e-mail: Philip.Vermeulen@ecb.int
THE RESPONSE OF FIRMS’ 
INVESTMENT AND 
FINANCING TO ADVERSE 
CASH FLOW SHOCKS






 3© European Central Bank, 2006
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and
reprint in the form of a different
publication, whether printed or
produced electronically, in whole or in
part, is permitted only with the explicit
written authorisation of the ECB or the
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from








Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  6
2 Related literature on bank relationships 7
3 Data 9
4 Adverse cash flow shocks, investment and
bank relationships 15
5 How do firms manage periods of adverse
liquidity shocks as a function of bank
relationships 20
6 What explain the probability of obtaining









We test whether firms with a single bank are better shielded from loss of credit and investment cuts 
in periods of adverse cash flow shocks than firms with multiple bank relationships. Our estimates 
of the cash flow sensitivity of investment show that both types of firms are equally subject to 
financing constraints that bind only in the event of adverse cash flow shocks. In these periods, 
firms incur lower cuts in investment expenditures when they can obtain extra credit. In periods of 
adverse cash flow shocks, the probability of obtaining extra bank debt becomes more sensitive to 
the size and leverage of the firm.  
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The paper investigates whether single bank relationships help firms to circumvent liquidity 
shortages in times of adverse cash flow shocks. Economic theory suggests that lending 
relationships are useful in overcoming asymmetric information problems between creditors and 
their clients. Consequently, firms with deep lending relationships (i.e. a single relationship) may 
benefit from better credit conditions. 
The paper tests whether having a single versus multiple bank relationships has an effect on the 
availability of  bank debt and on investment spending.  We first define periods of adverse cash flow 
shocks as periods in which the cash flow of the firm drops substantially relative to the capital stock 
of the firm. We argue that it is especially in times of adverse cash flows that financial constraints 
are more likely to be binding and that firms more strongly need external finance. If in these periods 
firms cannot restore liquidity fully, through the use of external finance, they have to reduce 
spending, including investment spending. 
First, we examine whether firms experience stronger financial constraints in periods of adverse 
cash flow shocks. Our estimates suggest that financial constraints bind only in periods of adverse 
cash flow shocks. Investment becomes sensitive to cash flow only in periods of adverse cash flow 
shocks. We then test whether firms ' investment reacts differently in these periods as a function of 
having a single bank relationship. We find that single and multiple bank relationship firms show 
the same investment reaction to cash flow in periods of adverse cash flow shocks. We argue that 
this provides evidence that single bank relationships are not especially helpful in alleviating 
financial constraints problems during bad times.  
Second, we analyse directly the restoration of liquidity after an adverse cash flow shock. We assess 
whether firms obtain extra credit from their banks, or whether they make use of trade credit (which 
can be considered as a more expensive substitute for bank debt). Our results indicate that firms that 
receive extra bank debt cut their investment spending to a much lower extent. We then test whether 
firms that have a single bank relationship obtain larger amounts of additional bank credit than firms 
with multiple bank relationships (conditional on obtaining extra bank debt), and find no significant 
difference.  
Third and finally, we investigate the determinants of the probability of obtaining extra bank debt. 
We find that firms with a single bank have a lower probability of obtaining bank credit in all times, 
this probability is not lower in bad times. We find that the probability of obtaining bank credit in 
adverse cash flow shock periods is higher the larger the firm and the lower the initial leverage.   
Combining our results we conclude that what really impedes investment in adverse cash flow 
periods is when firms cumulate a drop in cash flow and a contraction of external bank credit. The 













This paper investigates whether developing a single bank relationship helps firms to circumvent 
exceptional liquidity shortages. More precisely, we test whether having a single versus multiple 
bank relationships has an effect on the availability of finance and investment spending during times 
of adverse cash flow shocks. Adverse cash flow shocks are defined as large drops in cash flow 
(relative to the capital stock of the firm) from the previous year level. We argue that it is especially 
in times of adverse cash flows that financial constraints are more likely to be binding and that firms 
more strongly need external finance. If in these periods firms cannot restore liquidity fully, through 
the use of external finance, they have to reduce spending, including investment spending. To the 
extent that strong bank relationships alleviate asymmetric information problems, and that firms 
with a single bank have a closer lending relationship than firms with multiple banks, adverse cash 
flow shocks would have different effects on financing and investment for firms with a single versus 
multiple bank relationships. 
  Asymmetric information problems can generate financial constraints, whereby firms have 
limited access to external finance, and as a consequence, have to restrict spending below the 
optimal level (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Myers and Majluf, 1984). An 
extensive empirical literature, beginning with Fazzari et al (1988) identifies the types of firms that 
are subject to financial constraints1. We deviate from this literature in that we identify periods 
where financial constraints are binding. We analyse whether firms suffer from financial constraints 
in times of exceptional liquidity shortages. We then test whether firms that have a single bank 
relationship are better shielded from financial constraints. 
  Economic theory suggests that lending relationships are useful in overcoming asymmetric 
information problems between creditors and their clients. When a bank has developed a strong 
relationship with a firm, "soft" information about the creditworthiness of the firm can be collected 
by the bank. This can then be used in the bank's credit decisions. Consequently, firms with deep 
lending relationships may benefit from better credit conditions. A large empirical literature has 
investigated the benefits of strong banking relationships. Results suggest an ambiguous effect of 
lending relationships on the loan rate (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1995, d'Auria et 
al, 1999, Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000), but increased credit availability (Chirinko and Elston, 
2006), among others in bad times (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998, Vickery 2005), and reduced financial 
constraints (Hoshi et al, 1991, Elston, 1998, Garcia Marco and Ocaña, 1999, Houston and James, 
2001). 
  We are aware that a bank relationship has many dimensions. In the bank relationship literature 
the strength of the relationship has been defined according to either the length of the relationship 
                                                      
1    Typical firms characteristics that have been pointed out are, for example, firms' size, more opaque uncertain 
activities such as R&D activities, lower dividend pay out, high leverage or low bond ratings. 
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July 2006(Berger and Udell, 1995, Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000), the scope of the relationship (the types 
and number of financial services provided by the bank to the firm, as in Degryse and Van Cayseele, 
2000), banks ownership of the firm (Chirinko and Elston, 2006, Elsas, 1998, Garcia Marco and 
Ocaña, 1999), or the number of banks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Harhoff and Körting,1998, 
Houston and James, 2001). This paper is therefore closer to the last three papers as it focuses on the 
effect of a single versus multiple bank relationships.  
  We proceed in three steps. First, we examine whether firms experience stronger financial 
constraints in periods of adverse cash flow shocks. Following Fazzari et al (1988) we interpret the 
finding of different cash flow sensitivity of investment as evidence of different degree of financial 
constraints. Our estimates suggest that financial constraints bind only in periods of adverse cash 
flow shocks. We then test whether firms ' investment reacts differently in these periods as a 
function of having a single bank relationship. Second, we analyse directly the restoration of 
liquidity after an adverse cash flow shock. We assess whether firms obtain extra credit from their 
banks, or whether they make use of trade credit (which can be considered as a more expensive 
substitute for bank debt). Our results indicate that firms that receive extra bank debt cut their 
investment spending to a much lower extent. We then test whether firms that have a single bank 
relationship obtain larger amounts of additional bank credit than firms with multiple bank 
relationships (conditional on obtaining extra bank debt), and find no significant difference. Third 
and finally, we investigate the determinants of the probability of obtaining extra bank debt. A 
probit regression reveals that although we find that firms with a single bank have a lower 
probability of obtaining bank credit in all times, this probability is not lower in bad times. 
Ultimately, the paper aims at answering whether having more than 1 bank relationship matters in 
bad times both for the real and financial side of the firm. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. In section 2 we briefly describe the related literature. In section 3 we describe our data. In 
section 4 we investigate whether firm investment is affected by adverse cash flow shocks and 
whether having more than 1 bank relationships matters. In section 5 we investigate the behaviour of 
the firm financing when faced by an adverse cash flow shock. In Section 6 we investigate the 
probability of obtaining extra bank debt. Section 7 concludes.  
 
II. Related literature on bank relationships 
 
  A number of papers try to explain the motives for having multiple bank relationships. In 
general, multiple bank relationships should be costly as banks need to somehow charge the firm for 
the information gathering, screening and monitoring, in the credit process. On the other hand, being 
tied to only 1 bank, firms can be vulnerable to a hold-up problem in which the bank (that has all the 
important information on the firm) extracts rents from the firm. When going into a relationship 
with another bank, firms therefore should weigh the extra costs of monitoring with the benefit of 
competition between banks (Rajan, 1992, Von Thadden, 1992). We do not examine the 
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bank relationships reduce financial constraints.  
  There are also other reasons why firms might prefer multiple bank relationships. Detragiache et 
al. (2000) develop a model in which firms choose multiple relationships to avoid being denied 
refinancing of long term projects when their bank faces liquidity problems. Increasing the number 
of bank relationships increases the probability that at least one informed bank will refinance the 
projects. In our paper we rather investigate the liquidity of the firm, and test whether a firm that has 
more than 1 bank relationship has a higher probability of obtaining a loan when the firm has a 
liquidity problem   
  The empirical evidence on the impact of the strength of bank relationship reports ambiguous 
effects on the loan rate, and in general, a positive impact of credit availability and a reduction of the 
degree of financial constraints. Several empirical papers have found a link between the strength of 
bank relationships a firm has and the availability and cost of bank finance. Berger and Udell (1995) 
provide evidence that the loan rates are lower the longer the bank relationship. D'Auria et al. (1999) 
show that the interest rates charged by a bank are lower the larger the share of firm's debt in that 
bank, all other firm and bank characteristics being equal. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find 
that long lasting lending relationships increase the loan rate, while wider bank-relationships (i.e. 
when the firm buys different products and services from the same bank) reduce the loan rate. 
Chirinko and Elston (2006) show that in the German banking system, bank affiliated firms do not 
benefit from more long-term bank debt than independent firms, after controlling for a set of firm's 
characteristics. Petersen and Rajan’s (1994) results indicate that the loan rate increases with the 
number of banks a firm has, on a set of small U.S. firms. They also find that the amount of trade 
debt paid late is positively related to the number of banks, i.e. the more banks a firm has, the more 
it pays its trade debt late. This suggests that the availability of bank credit worsens as firms have 
more bank relationships. Harhoff and Körting (1998) follow Petersen and Rajan (1994) by using 
trade debt to infer the availability of external finance. They confirm their finding that trade debt 
paid late increases with the number of banks, on a set of small German firms. Cole (1998), also 
using small U.S. firms, finds that the number of banks a firm has, has a negative effect on the 
probability of being extended a loan. In general therefore the literature has found that more bank 
relationships are associated with worse credit availability.  
  The present paper considers in particular the role of banks in periods of adverse liquidity 
shocks. Some other papers have explicitly analysed the availability of credit in bad times. Elsas and 
Krahnen (1998) show that house banks in Germany increase their financing share of firms when 
these firms face rating downgrades, thereby providing an insurance service. Suzuki and Wright 
(1985) argue that in Japan keiretsu members benefit from rescue operations from banks of the 
group. Vickery (2005) investigates the role of banks in Asia during the Asian financial crisis. Firms 
                                                      
2   For such analysis, see for example Ongena and Smith (2000). They investigate empirically the determinants of the 
number of bank relationships in a set of large firms of 20 European countries. They find that next to size of the firms 
also country specific reasons such as the efficiency of the judicial system and the enforcement of creditor rights 
explain cross-country differences in the number of bank relationships. 
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finds that close bank relationships were not leading to greater access to credit prior to the crisis, so 
that relationships only seems important in bad times. Berlin and Mester (1998) argue that, in case 
of interest rate shocks, banks may smooth interest rate fluctuations for clients with which they 
maintain strong relationships, and even reallocate their credits towards them. Conigliani et al 
(1997) show evidence that the probability of an increase in the interest rates charged on bank loans 
following a monetary tightening is higher for more indebted firms and for firms with a larger 
number of lending banks.  
In this paper, we first test whether firms that have closer ties to their bank (proxied by having a 
single bank relationship) face less financial constraints, thanks to reduced asymmetric information 
problems as evidenced by a lower cash flow sensitivity of investment (along the line initiated by 
Fazzari et al, 1998).. A number of papers have investigated this question. In a Q model of 
investment for a sample of Japanese firms, Hoshi et al. (1991) find that firms with close ties to a 
bank (in a Keiretsu) are less sensitive to cash flow than independent firms. Elston (1998) finds that 
German firms that are partially owned by banks show less sensitivity to cash flow. Garcia-Marco 
and Ocafia (1999) show that the Euler equation derived from the neoclassical model without 
financing constraints, holds for firms which are partly owned by banks, while it fails for the other 
firms. For US listed firms, Houston and James (2001) find that the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment is significantly greater for firms that rely on one single bank than for firms with 
multiple bank relationships, contrary to other papers in the literature they argue that information 
asymmetries might be less severe for firms with multiple bank relationships. On the other hand 
they also find that for moderate investment levels bank dependent firms (i.e. firms with little public 
debt) show lower cash flow sensitivity, while for large investment levels bank-dependent firms 
show larger sensitivity. They interpret this as evidence that banks are unwilling to finance large 
investment projects.  
 




We combine two datasets which are collected by the National Bank of Belgium. The first is the 
annual accounts dataset from the Balance Sheet Office which reports annual balance sheets and 
profits and losses accounts of firms since 1985. The second is the Credit Register dataset from the 
Central Credit Office, which collects information on all credit lines and loans (the amount 
authorised and the amount taken up) at the end of the month from each bank to each firm, from 
1997 onwards. The annual accounts dataset is fully representative of Belgian non-financial firms. 
Indeed, by legal obligation, nearly every firm in Belgium has to report its annual accounts3. 
                                                      
3   In general, except for financial intermediaries, who have to obey special rules, all firms governed by Belgian law 
have to report their annual accounts. 
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Office5. We consider all sectors of economic activity, so we do not focus on manufacturing firms.  
  We do not keep all the firms that are matched in the two datasets. First, we do not consider 
very small firms. The choice of excluding very small firms is simply imposed to us by the fact that 
the detail of the information provided to the Balance sheet office depends on the size of the firm 
and that very small firms need to provide much less detail to the annual accounts dataset.6 
Importantly, therefore compared to Petersen and Rajan (1994), Harhoff and Körting (1998) and 
Cole (1998) the median firm in our dataset is much larger, i.e. 7.5 million euros in total assets. For 
the Belgian economy, these firms are considered as medium or large. Third, we remove outliers 
from the data, trimming on investment-capital ratio, cash flow capital ratio, sales growth, output-
capital ratio as well as a set of financial ratios in order to clean our sample from financially 
distressed firms. Fourth, we also require the firms to have at least 7 consecutive annual accounts. 
Finally we only consider firms with annual accounts that cover the period from January to 
December7. The data appendix describes in more details the variables definition and trimming 
procedure. Our final unbalanced panel includes 8415 observations on 1448 firms. The dataset 
covers the period 1997-2002. 
  One should note that, given our trimming procedure, firms typically associated with financing 
constraints, such as small firms, firms that experience high and rapid growth, or financially 
distressed firms, are absent from our sample. Therefore we do not expect to have firms that are 
financially constrained over all periods of time. Rather we investigate whether these firms may 
experience financial constraints occasionally, in periods of exceptional adverse liquidity shocks. 
We then examine whether having a single versus multiple bank relationships may help to overcome 
these liquidity shortages. 
    We define adverse cash flow reductions as the 1st quartile of changes in cash flow over 
capital. These represent a minimal reduction of the cash flow to capital ratio of 0.05 (i.e. 5% of the 
capital stock of the firm.)  
  We adopt the following definition of a bank relationship: firm x has a relationship with bank y 
as soon as bank y reports a loan, credit line or collateral for that firm. We then construct an 
                                                      
4   Banks do not report to the Credit Register in two cases: (1) when the sum of all credits of a bank to a firm does not 
exceed 25,000 Euros, (2) branches of foreign banks do not report to the Credit Register, on the contrary to 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
5   Only Degryse et al (2005) have used this dataset; they analyse the effect of bank mergers on bank relationships for 
small firms. Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) have also examined the effects of bank relationships in Belgium, but 
they made use of a smaller database. 
6   Although small firms also have to report their annual account and credits, the information they provide is less 
precise. For example they do not have to report sales. Further since credits are reported only when total credits from 
a bank is higher than 25.000 euros, there is a risk of mismeasurement of the lending relationship. Only firms that 
exceed certain thresholds provide enough information in the annual accounts dataset for our analysis. We consider 
firms for which yearly average of its workforce is at least 100 or when at least two of the following thresholds were 
exceeded: (1) yearly average of workforce: 50, (2) turnover (excluding VAT): EUR 6,250,000, (3) balance sheet 
total: EUR 3,125,000. (The values of the latter two thresholds are altered every four years in order to take account of 
inflation). 
7   This is ensures consistency within the sample and time-consistency with the deflators used. 
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time as firms change their number of bank relationships. 
  Other indicators of bank relationships have been used in the literature. Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000) use a measure of the scope of the bank relationship based on the number of bank 
services provided to the firm. Since we have information on all types of credit, credit lines and 
collateral, we could in principle construct such an indicator. However, we have no information on 
other types of services than credit. Further the literature is mute as to what type of credit 
strengthens the relationship, and therefore on the appropriate weighting to apply to the various 
credit types.  
  Some other papers, in particular those analysing the German bank system, focus on the role of 
house banks. (See for example Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). Indeed, firms may have multiple banks, 
but with a strong relationship with only one of these. House banks are sometimes identified by the 
banks' equity stake in the firm. Such information is unavailable in our dataset. 
  Finally, some authors insist on the duration of the bank relationship (see, for example, Berger 
and Udell, 1995, or Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000.  In our sample Credit register data covers 
only 6 years, which puts strong limitations on such a measure.  
 
Single versus multiple bank relationships  
 
We report in Table 1 the number of observations according to the number of bank 
relationships. 92% of the firms in our sample have 4 or less than 4 bank relationships. The average 
number of bank relationships is 2.6. The 25% percentile is 2 bank relationships and the 75% 
percentile is 3 bank relationships. These numbers are very comparable (albeit slightly larger) than 
the numbers for the US or Germany. By comparison, the small German firms in Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) (that are smaller than ours) have on average 1.8 bank relationships. In their sample 
the 25% percentile is 1 bank relationship and the 75% percentile is 2 bank relationships. Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) report that in their sample of small US firms, the smallest firms tend to have just 
over 1 lender, while the largest firms have about three lenders. So generally, firms either have only 
1 bank relationship or when they have more than 1 relationship they have just a few relationships. 
In the following we will therefore mostly (although not exclusively) concentrate on the differences 
of firms when they have just one or more than 1 (i.e. multiple) relationships. From the moment a 
firm has more than 1 relationship, at least 2 banks should have information about the firm so that 
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# bank relationships  N  % 
1 1606  19% 
2 2879  34% 
3 2154  26% 
4 1086  13% 
5 or more  408  8% 
 
Table 2 reports the median value of asset size, some financial ratios and profitability, 
distinguishing between firms with a single bank relationship and firms with multiple bank 
relationships. Differences are tested for using a Chi-squared test of significant differences in the 
medians. First, the median firm with a single bank relationship is significantly smaller than the 
median firm with multiple bank relationships. Total assets amounts to 5 millions euros for the 
median firm with a single bank against 8.4 millions euros for the median firm with multiple bank 
relationships. Second, compared to the median firm with multiple bank relationships, the median 
firm with a single bank relationships also has significantly less bank debt (as a fraction of assets) 
(12% versus 18%), less long term bank debt (4.7% versus 7.3%), less short term bank debt 
(0%versus 4.7%) and less credit lines (7% versus 13.5%). The lower amount of credit lines for 
single bank relationship firms implies less liquidity buffer. This may make them more likely to be 
financially constrained, especially in case of adverse liquidity shocks. Houston and James (2001) 
argue that the credit lines to asset ratio is a measure of ‘slack’ in the banking relationship. For large 
US listed firms, they find a median credit lines to asset ratio of 8% for firms with 1 bank 
relationship versus 11% for firms with multiple bank relationships. So more bank relationships are 
clearly associated with more bank debt and more ‘slack’ in the banking relationship. However the 
stylized fact that single bank relationship firms have less bank credit does not imply by itself that 
these firms are ‘constrained’ in any sense. Given a fixed cost of setting up a relationship, firms that 
are in less need of external finance may optimally choose to have just one bank. Third, there is no 
significant difference in the ratio of net trade debt (i.e. trade debt minus trade credit) over assets 
between firms with a single bank and firms with multiple bank relationships. This provides another 
indication that firms with a single bank are not necessarily constrained as one would expect that 
otherwise if they were constrained, they might combine lower bank debt with higher net trade debt. 
Fourth, the median firm with a single bank relationships is also slightly more profitable (with a 
profit to asset ratio of 13%) than the median multiple bank relationship firm (with a profit to asset 
ratio of 12%). This is not simply due to the fact that firms with a single bank have lower interest 
charges as they have lower bank debt. The last two rows of Table 2 shows that earnings before 
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(medians) 
  1 bank > 1 bank X²  
assets (million euros)  5.099 8.447 211.45 *** 
bank debt/assets  0.121 0.181 69.35 *** 
LT bank debt/assets  0.047 0.073 32.09 *** 
ST bank debt/assets  0.006 0.047 106.60 *** 
unused lines of credit /assets  0.070 0.135 295.99 *** 
Net trade debt/assets  -0.078 -0.072 1.94  
profits/assets 0.134 0.124 13.78 *** 
EBIT/assets 0.052 0.045 15.56 *** 
EBT/assets 0.042 0.032 19.75 *** 
EBIT: earnings before interest and taxes, EBT: earnings before taxes 
X² Chi-squared test of differences in the medians 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
  The role of bank relationships for the availability of bank finance is complicated by the fact 
that generally size is positively associated with the number of bank relationships. Ceteris paribus, 
larger firms have more bank relationships. This finding is quite robust and has been found also by 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) for U.S. firms, Ongena and Smith (2000) for a sample of very large 
firms in 20 European countries and Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) for 
German firms. It can also be found in our dataset.  
Firms with a single bank relationship should suffer less from asymmetric information 
problems. However small firms are generally associated with more asymmetric information 
problems. It is therefore possible that small firms endogenously choose more often to just have 1 
bank relationship. In essence whereas their size makes them more vulnerable to asymmetric 
information problems, they can try to alleviate this by having one strong bank relationship.  
In the literature there have been suggested a number of explanations for the positive association 
between firm size and the number of bank relationships. First, the cost of information gathering 
could be lower for larger firms, so that the advantages of a single bank relationship may be lower 
for large firms. Second, the gain of multiple banks becomes higher as firms having ties to multiple 
banks, firms may be better able to solve the hold-up problem, i.e. reduce the monopolistic power of 
a single bank. Third, given that the nominal amount of lending should increase with firm size, 
banks themselves may favour syndicated credits for risk reduction purposes. Fourth, larger firms 
might need more specialized services and have different specialized banks for different services.  
However, it should be emphasized that having multiple bank relationships is certainly not a 
perfect proxy for size. Table 3 shows that for firms with assets below 4 million euros, the 
occurrence of a single bank relationship is 34%. The occurrence of a single bank relationship 
declines gradually as firms get larger. However still 11% of the firms with assets above 16 million 
euros have only 1 bank relationship. Further evidence that the number of bank relationship is not a 
13
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multiple bank relationship. These estimations confirm that, in general, larger firms tend to have 
multiple bank relationships. In addition, firms with multiple bank relationships also have lower 
investment rate, less cash flow but larger credit lines, as well as higher bank debt.  
Table 3: Size and a single bank relationships    
   number of  % of firms 
   observations  with 1 bank 
assets <= 4  1788    0.34   
4 < assets <=8  2593    0.19   
8 < assets <=16  1848    0.14   
16 < assets  2186    0.11   
entire sample  8415     0.19    
 
    Table 4 below provides a first examination of the relationship between the amount of bank 
credit firms have and the number of bank relationships and/or the size of the firm. Given the 
correlation between number of bank relationships and size, the positive relationship between bank 
debt over asset and bank relationships found in table 2 could potentially be spurious if it is truly 
size that matters for access to bank finance. To check this, we regress the ratio of bank debt over 
assets on bank relationship and size dummies. We define 4 bank relationship dummies (D2, D3, D4 
and D5P, signifying 2, 3, 4 and 5 or more bank relationships respectively) and 3 size class dummies 
(DSIZ4_8, DSIZ8_16 and DSIZ16 signifying asset size between 4 and 8 million, between 8 and 16 
million euros and more than 16 million euros). Table 4 reports the results of the OLS regression of 
bank debt over assets on those 7 dummies. The first column presents the results without industry 
dummies; the second column includes time and industry dummies. The constant term of the 
regression represents the average bank debt over assets ratio for firms with a single bank 




Working Paper Series No 658
July 2006Table 4: Bank debt as a function of bank relationships and size  
OLS results Dependent variable: bank/assets  
 coef.  std  err    coef. std  err   
c 0.165  25.53 ***  0.126  14.71 *** 
D2 0.012  2.50 ***  0.010  2.15 ** 
D3 0.026  4.96 ***  0.029  5.63 *** 
D4 0.051  8.03 ***  0.055  8.93 *** 
D5P 0.053  4.86 ***  0.064  5.97 *** 
DSIZ4_8 0.009  1.67 *  0.009  1.87 * 
DSIZ8_16 0.027  4.78 ***  0.025  4.56 *** 
DSIZ16 0.000  0.07   -0.001  -0.21  
8415 observations. All equations include time dummies  
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
 
The regression results in table 4 show that firms have statistically significantly more bank debt 
(relative to assets) the more bank relationships they have, controlling for size. The difference is 
also economically significant. Whereas the smallest single bank relationship firms have a ratio of 
bank debt to assets of 0.17, the same small firms have a bank debt ratio of 0.18 if they have 2 bank 
relationships, 0.195 if they have three relationships and 0.221 if they have 4 relationships. Note that 
one should not necessarily interpret this result as if by increasing the number of banks 
relationships, firms are able to increase the amount of bank debt they carry. The causality could run 
the other way. Some firms might not be able to increase the number of bank relationships they 
have. And firms that want (and have access!) to have more bank debt may endogenously choose to 
have more banks, i.e. want to avoid having only a single relationship when increasing bank debt.  
  Also size is associated with bank debt, controlling for bank relationships. Firms that have 
assets lower than 4 million do not have significantly less debt than firms with assets above 4 but 
below 8 million. The amount of bank debt increases by 0.027 for firms between 8 and 16 million. It 
declines again for firms larger than 16 million euros of assets to the level of the firms below 8 
million euros. So only medium sized firms between 8 and 16 million assets have higher bank debt. 
One possible explanation is that the smallest firms are quantity constrained in obtaining bank 
finance. As firms expand and get larger they are able to obtain more bank debt. The largest firms 
however, likely have access to other sources of finance besides bank debt, such as equity or bond 
debt. The finding that the largest firms have less bank debt is consistent with the findings in 
Houston and James (1996) that bank borrowing decreases in size for large publicly traded US 
firms.  
 
IV. Adverse cash flow shocks, investment and bank relationships 
 
  The results above have shown that firms with a single relationship have on average less bank 
debt; however this does not imply that they are more financially constrained. This section uses a 
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financial constraints in periods of adverse cash flow shocks than in normal business conditions, and 
whether there are differences between firms with a single bank and firms with multiple bank 
relationships. Based on the idea that when firms have limited access to external sources of finance, 
investment depends more extensively on internally generated liquidity (i.e. cash flow), the test 
interprets differences in the cash flow sensitivity of investment as evidence of differences in the 
degree of financial constraints. We estimate an error correction model for investment, as in Bond et 
al.(2003) or Mairesse et al.(1999)9  
 
Iit/Kit-1 = δi+δt+α1.Iit-1/Kit-2+α2.∆yit+α3.∆yit-1+α4.CFit/Kit-1+α5.(yit-2-kit-2)+εit       (1) 
 
where Iit/Kit-1 is the investment rate, ∆yit is sales growth, CFit/Kit-1 is the cash flow to capital ratio 
and (yit-2-kit-2 ) is the log of the output to capital ratio. We first estimate (1) to check whether in our 
dataset firm investment spending is sensitive to cash flow fluctuations irrespective of whether 
adverse cash flow shocks have occurred or not and irrespective of whether firms have a single or 
multiple bank relationships, i.e. we test whether α4 is positive.  Interacting the cash flow variable 
with a dummy D1, indicating the presence of only 1 bank relationship provides a test whether firms 
that have 1 bank relationship are subject to stronger financial constraints than firms with multiple 
relationships. We test first if during times of adverse cash flow shocks, sensitivity to cash flow is 
higher (irrespective of bank relationships). We then test whether bank relationships matter during 
times of adverse cash flow shocks.  
  Evaluating the degree of financial constraints by comparing the cash flow sensitivity of 
investment across different subsamples has become standard in the literature. However, it has been 
criticised on several grounds. First, it has been argued that because cash flow may proxy for future 
profits or future sales, finding a positive cash flow sensitivity of investment cannot be taken as 
evidence of financial constraints. We examine this issue along the lines of Bond et al (2003). In 
table A.2. in the appendix we find no evidence that cash flow helps to forecast future sales growth. 
Further, there is no a priori reason why cash flow should proxy differently for profit in single 
versus multiple bank relationship firms, whereas it is the difference in the cash flow sensitivity that 
is interpreted as evidence in favour of financing constraints. Our estimates of forecasting models of 
sales growth, in the spirit of Bond et al. (2003), show weak evidence of cash flow proxying for 
future profits. Second, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary (1999) show that firms that 
are classified as the most financially constrained are less sensitive to cash flow. This is consistent 
                                                      
8   Alternative strategies have been used. One is based on the Q theory of investment, and amounts to estimate the cash 
flow sensitivity of investment in a Q equation. We can not follow this line of research because that would restrict 
our sample to quoted firms alone. 
  Another strand of the literature uses a more structural approach that consists in estimating the Euler equation that 
would prevail when the firms are financially unconstrained. Rejection of the intertemporal equilibrium is taken as 
evidence of financial constraints. However, rejection of the Euler equation may not only be due to financial 
constraints but also to a misspecification of the underlying theoretical model. 
9   A more general specification would allow for the lagged cash flow-capital ratio. However, preliminary estimates 
suggests that due to colinearity this broader specification produces insignificant coefficients. 
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firms with negative cash flows - become insensitive to cash flow fluctuations. This suggests that 
the relation between the degree of financial constraints and the cash flow sensitivity of investment 
may not be monotonic but rather concave, i.e. increasing with the degree of financial constraints 
and then decreasing in case of financial distress. As explained in section 3, we clean our sample for 
distressed firms; we are therefore confident that in our sample negative cash flow shocks are not 
synonymous of financial distress. Rather they capture times of stronger liquidity rationing.  
  All equations are estimated with fixed effects and time dummies. We consider all variables as 
endogenous. We use the System GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998)10. Standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for small sample bias using 
Windmeijer (2004)’s correction11. In the investment equation, the instrument set for the difference 
equation is the Arellano-Bond matrix for Iit-2/Kit-3, Iit-3/Kit-4, stacked ∆yit-2, ∆yit-3, CFit-2/Kit-3, CFit-
3/Kit-4, (yit-2-kit-2) and (yit-3-kit-3)12. The instrument set for the level equation are Arellano-Bond 
matrices for ∆(It-1/Kt-2), ∆∆yt-1, ∆(CFt-1/Kt-2), ∆(yit-2-kit-2). When the equations are estimated with 
interactions terms we also include the dummies in the instrument set. Table 5 provides a summary 
of the variables used in the regression.  
 
Table 5 : investment equations variables  
  single bank relationship  multiple bank relationships. 
 Mean  Std  median  mean  std  median 
It/Kt-1 0.12 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.07 
log(Yt/Yt-1)  0.03 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.03 
CFt/Kt-1 0.26 0.43 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.16 
Yt/Kt-1 6.45 9.56 2.97 5.82 8.58 3.06 
 
  Table 6 reports the SGMM estimates of equation (1). The Sargan, m1 and m2 statistics report 
no misspecification or identifying restriction bias. All coefficients have the expected sign. The 
error correction term is not significant. First we estimate equation (1) for the full sample. The cash 
flow coefficient is high and significant at 0.19 indicating that in the full dataset, investment is 
sensitive to cash flow. In the second column, we test whether cash flow sensitivity is lower for 
firms with a single bank. The coefficient of the interaction term D1.CFit/Kit-1 is negative at -0.10, but 
it is imprecisely estimated and not significantly different from zero. The results indicate that, 
irrespective of adverse cash flow periods, there is no significant difference in the degree of 
financial constraints for firms with a single relationship versus firms with multiple bank 
relationships.  
                                                      
10   Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the first-differenced GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) suffers from 
small sample biases and low precision, and that exploiting the additional moment conditions of the system-GMM 
estimator allows to substantially improve the estimators. 
11   The second-step estimator of SGMM typically underestimates the true standard errors. 
12   We restrict the number of lags in the instrument set to avoid potential overfitting problems. 
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shocks.   If bank relationships are valuable, they should be most valuable in times of adverse cash 
flow shocks. Adverse cash flow shocks reduce the internal liquidity available for firm investment 
spending. In these periods, a single bank relationship could be more valuable and should lead to 
easier restoring of liquidity. Firms that are able to increase external finance should reduce 
investment spending by a lower extent. The findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994), Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) and Cole (1998) indicate that the availability of bank debt is higher for firms with a 
single bank relationship. On the other hand however the findings by Houston and James (2001) 
imply the contrary.  
 W e first check, in column (3) whether cash flow sensitivity is higher in periods of adverse cash 
flow shocks. The interaction term between the dummy for adverse cash flow shocks and the cash 
flow-capital ratio is high, positive and significant at 0.29. The coefficient in front of CFit/Kit-1 which 
now measures cash flow sensitivity outside periods of adverse shocks turns to zero. So the 
estimates suggest that financial constraints bind mainly in bad times.  
  Finally, we test whether having a single bank allows reducing financial constraints in these 
periods. We introduce an interaction term with both a dummy for adverse cash flow shocks and a 
dummy for a single bank relationship. The results indicate that the number of bank relationships is 
irrelevant for the degree of financial constraints, both in periods of normal cash flow fluctuations 
and in periods of adverse liquidity shocks. So our results indicate that firms with a single bank 
relationship do not face stronger financial constraints than firms with multiple bank relationships, 
both in periods of normal cash flow fluctuations and in periods of adverse cash flow shocks13.  
 
                                                      
13   The interaction term between D1 and Dbad may be insignificant for two reasons. First, only 4% of the observations 
relate to firms with a single bank relationship in periods of adverse cash flow shocks (by construction 25% of the 
observations experience adverse cash flow shocks, and 15% of the firms have a single bank relationship). Second, 
the lack of significance may reflect heterogeneity across firms with a single bank relationship. Having a single bank 
may reflect the strategic choice of a firm with sufficient financing from other sources (own funds, equity ...). 
Alternatively, firms may be restricted to a single bank due to financial constraints. These two cases will of course 
have very different implications for financial constraints, so that the coefficient turns insignificant The next sections 
indeed highlight two opposite cases in how firms adjust their financing in response to the adverse liquidity shock 
(some firms can compensate for the liquidity drop through increased (bank) debt, while some others experience a 
reduction in external credit in addition to the adverse cash flow shock). 
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  coef tstat    coef tstat    coef tstat    coef tstat  
constant  0.04  2.69   ***  0.04 2.22  **  0.08 4.02  ***  0.12 3.05 *** 
Iit-1/Kit-2 0.07 2.40  **  0.06 2.34  **  0.06 1.79  *  0.09 1.57 + 
∆yit 0.22 0.81    0.21 0.81    0.20 0.64    0.37 1.15  
∆yit-1 0.06 1.94  **  0.05 1.91  *  0.05 1.64  *  0.05 1.42  
CFit/Kit-1 0.19 2.96  ***  0.22 3.78  ***  0.00 -0.03     -0.11 -0.83  
Dbad.CFit/Kt-1          0.29  2.60   ***  0.45 2.39 ** 
D1.CFit/Kit-1      -0.10 -1.04         0.21 1.12  
D1.Dbad.CFit/Kit-1               -0.37 -0.82   
(y-k)it-2 0.00  -0.49   0.00  -0.65   0.00  0.33    0.00 0.35  
Dbad           -0.05  -1.60   +  -0.22 -1.64 * 
D1      0.03  1.18          -0.17  -1.47   
D1.Dbad                0.66  1.45   
    p-value      p-value      p-value      p-value   
Sargan  37.08  0.21   35.61  0.22   30.75  0.43   19.90  0.80  
m1 -7.97  0.00   -8.09  0.00   -8.26  0.00   -4.31  0.00  
m2 -0,61  0,54   -0,57  0,57   -0,37  0,71   1,10 0,27  
Second step system GMM estimates with Windmeijer (2000) 's corrected t-stat  Second step Sargan. All 
estimations include time dummies. As to the difference equation, we use Arellano-Bond instrument matrix 
for It-1/Kt-2 to It-2/Kt-3, stacked ∆yt-1, ∆yt-2, CFt-1/Kt-2, CFt-2/Kt-3, (yt-1-kt-1) (yt-2-kt-2)  As to the level equation, we 
use Arellano-Bond instrument matrix for ∆It/Kt-1, ∆∆yt, ∆(yt-1-kt-1), Dbad is a dummy that is equal to 1 when 
∆(CF/K) is below the first quartile. D1 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm has a single bank relationship 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
 
  We find that the number of bank relationship does not affect the degree of financial constraints, 
either in normal times or in case of adverse liquidity shocks, for the firms in our sample. This 
contrasts with previous findings that bank relationships allow to smooth financial constraints (see, 
for instance, Elston, 1998, Garcia-Marco and Ocafia, 1999, Hoshi et al, 199114). Further, contrary 
to Suzuki and Wright (1985), Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Berlin and Mester (1998), we do find no 
evidence that bank relationships allows the firm to escape financial constraints in exceptional 
times15.  
                                                      
14   Hoshi et al (1991) find that investment of Japanese firms belonging to a keiretsu is less sensitive to liquidity. Elston 
(1998) shows that, in Germany, the cash flow sensitivity of investment is lower for firms in which banks have a high 
direct equity stake. Garcia-Macro and Ocafia (1999) show that the neoclassical model, without financing constraints, 
holds for Spanish firms in which banks have a high ownership, while it fails to represent the other firms.  
15   Suzuki and Wright (1985) argue that in Japan keiretsu members benefit from rescue operations from banks of the 
group that reduce their bankruptcy risk. Elsas and Krishnan (1998) show that house banks provide liquidity 
insurance to their clients. They increase their credit to their clients when they experience a (small) unexpected drop 
in credit rating, while, on the contrary, other banks will reduce their credit to firms. Also, Berlin and Mester (1998) 
argue that, in case of interest rate shocks, banks may smooth interest rate fluctuations for clients with which they 
maintain strong relationships, and even reallocate their credits towards them.  
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V. How do firms manage periods of adverse liquidity shocks as a function of bank 
relationships 
 
  The results in the above section show that financial constraints bind in periods of adverse cash 
flow shocks, but reveal no difference in cash flow sensitivity of investment between firms with a 
single versus multiple bank relationships. We now examine in more detail how firm’s investment 
and financing respond to adverse cash flow shocks as a function of bank relationships. In line with 
the above results we expect little difference between firms with a single versus firms with multiple 
bank relationships.  
  In the analysis we make a distinction between firms that increase bank debt following the 
adverse shock and firms that decrease bank debt. Extra financing should be associated with higher 
investment, irrespective of bank relationships. Also, if net trade debt is a substitute for bank debt, 
one should expect net trade debt to increase when bank debt decreases and vice versa, again 
irrespective of bank relationships.   
  Our main focus is on testing whether firms with a single versus firms with multiple bank 
relationships obtain different amount of credit at times of adverse cash flow shocks, conditional on 
either increasing bank debt or decreasing bank debt. Table 7 reports the median value of the 
changes in bank debt, trade debt and investment over the absolute value of the change in cash flow, 
in periods of adverse cash flow shocks. The absolute value of the change in cash flow signifies the 
amount of loss in liquidity and is used to standardize the changes in bank debt, trade debt and 
investment. Table 7 also reports indicators such as size (total assets), profitability as measured by 
profits over assets, and debt ratios the beginning of the period, i.e. just before the adverse cash flow 
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  >0  <0  X²    1 bank  >1 bank  X²    1 bank  >1 bank  X²   
# obs  690  718     107 583     152 566    
changes in financing and expenditures over the absolute value of the change in 
cash flow 
      
∆(bank debt)/|∆CF|  0.893  -0.644  1353 *** 0.508 0.924 2.49   -0.695 -0.641 0.03  
∆(net trade debt)/|∆CF|  -0.114  0.141  9.56 ***  -0.011 -0.141 0.90   0.067 0.153 0.83  
∆(bankdebt+nettrade 
debt)/|∆CF| 
0.807 -0.631  198.1 *** 0.672 0.815 0.28   -0.689 -0.604 0.53  
∆(investment)/|∆CF|  -0.080  -0.201  12.38 *** -0.032 -0.086 0.28   -0.216 -0.198 0.13  
initial values (t-1)                
assets (million euros)  8.951  7.583  7.11 ***  4.943 9.501 10.63 *** 5.974 8.037 6.54 ** 
profits/assets  0.135  0.140  1.14   0.134 0.136 0.01   0.142 0.140 0.00  
credit lines/assets  0.144  0.117  11.64 *** 0.097 0.154 12.05 *** 0.066 0.131 26.17 *** 
leverage  1.661  1.537  1.64   1.846 1.601 3.99 ** 1.265 1.611 5.64 ** 
Net trade debt/assets  -0.081  -0.093  1.92   -0.106 -0.077 1.87   -0.088 -0.094 0.13  
bank debt/assets  0.133  0.172  13.14 *** 0.076 0.141 3.99 ** 0.160 0.175 0.13  
X² is a Chi-squared test of differences in the medians 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level         
1408 observations                  
 
  A first finding is that following an adverse cash flow shock, approximately one half of the 
periods (690), firms benefit from an increase in bank debt while the other half of the periods (718) 
firms experience a reduction in bank credit, which reduces the available finance further. Firms that 
experience a cut in bank debt significantly increase debt from their trade partners (a median 
increase of 0.14 as a fraction of the drop in cash flow). Likewise firms that increase bank debt 
reduce their reliance on trade debt significantly (a median drop of 0.11 as a fraction of the drop in 
cash flow). The substitution of bank debt by trade debt indicates that the financing behaviour in 
times of adverse cash flow shocks is at least partially explained by supply of credit by banks rather 
than simply a demand reaction by firms. Indeed if trade debt is more expensive than bank debt as 
suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1994), the substitution behaviour evidenced here can be 
explained by rationing of bank debt during adverse cash flow shocks. Firms that benefit from 
increases in bank lending, obtain extra credit that compensate for 89 percents of the reduction in 
cash flow. Still, they cut investment by 0.08 of the reduction in cash flow. Firms that, in addition to 
the liquidity shortfall experience reductions in bank credit and do not compensate for this through a 
sufficiently high increase in trade debt, so that the total amount of credit diminishes, reduce their 
investment spending by a much higher 0.20. What distinguishes the groups that increase and 
decrease bank lending is their size and initial bank lending. Firms that benefit from a compensation 
case of large negative cash flow shocks 
Table 7: median change in debt and investment over the absolute value of cash flow change in 
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significantly lower initial bank debt over assets ratio. This is consistent with banks being more 
willing to lend to larger firms and firms with initially low leverage, especially in periods of adverse 
shocks.  
  The last columns of Table 7 reveal that there are no significant differences between firms with 
a single bank relationship and firms with multiple bank relationships with respect to the size of 
changes in bank debt and trade debt and investment following an adverse cash flow shock. The 
amount of extra credit (or credit cuts) is of the same order of magnitude whether the firm has a 
single bank or multiple banks relationships. Note that firms may look for additional banks in order 
to compensate for the liquidity shortage16. Results in Table 7 consider the current number of bank 
relationships; so if firms that have a single bank before the cash flow shock augment their number 
of bank relationships, they will be characterised as having multiple bank relationships.   
  The significant cash flow sensitivity and the substitution of bank debt by trade debt during 
times of adverse cash flow shocks indicate that financial constraints bind. Having a single or 
multiple bank relationships however does not seems to affect the degree of financial constraints. In 
case of adverse liquidity shocks, larger firms and firms with initially lower bank-debt over assets 
ratio (partly) compensate the cash flow shortfall through extra bank credit. Smaller firms and firms 
with higher initial bank debt experience a reduction in external finance in addition to the cash flow 
drop. They also cut their investment spending more severely. There is no significant difference 
between firms with a single and multiple bank relationships in the increase in debt following an 
adverse liquidity shock, conditional on obtaining extra credit. The next section examines more 
precisely what determines the probability of obtaining extra bank debt, in the spirit of Cole (1998). 
We specifically examine how this probability is modified by the occurrence of large negative cash 
flow shocks, and by the number of bank relationships.  
 
VI. What explain the probability of obtaining extra bank debt in periods of adverse cash flow 
shocks 
 
  The main question we are interested in is whether single bank relationship firms significantly 
change their probability of obtaining extra credit in bad times. If a single bank relationship is 
important during bad times, one would expect that credit would be more often granted during those 
bad times. We use a probit estimation to estimate the probability of obtaining extra bank debt along 
the lines of Cole (1988) during normal times versus times of adverse cash flow shocks. Our 
explanatory variables are firm’s size, initial level of bank debt over assets, initial cash flow over 
assets, the initial level of credit lines over assets and a dummy for a single bank relationship. We 
also include time dummies and industry dummies. Table A.4 in appendix reports the estimation of 
the Probit model with random effects; the coefficient are of the same order of magnitude. We 
                                                      
16   This is supported by a Probit estimation on the probability of going from one to multiple bank relationships. The 
results presented in Table A.3 in the appendix suggest that firms opt to multiple bank relationships when sales and 
investment are stronger, and also when they experience a large negative cash flow shock. 
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willing to lend to large firms with low leverage. We expect a higher cash flow over assets to reduce 
the probability of obtaining extra credit, since more liquid firms should have less need for extra 
credit. Bank credit has an ambiguous effect. As Cole 1988) argue, increasing credit to a firm allows 
the bank to acquire additional information about the firm; it may therefore facilitate access to 
additional credit. On the other hand, it augments leverage, which tends to reduce access to extra 
finance. Therefore, bank debt over assets may have an ambiguous effect on the probability of 
obtaining extra bank debt. This is not the case for credit lines, since they do not induce an increase 
in leverage (as long as they are not utilised), so only the first effect may be at play. Consequently, 
we expect that higher credit lines have a positive impact on the probability of obtaining extra bank 
debt. And we test formally if during adverse cash flow shocks single bank firms have a different 
probability of obtaining extra credit.  
 
Table 8: Probit model : Probability of obtaining extra bank debt in normal times and during periods of adverse 
cash flow shocks 
Dependent variable: D(∆bank>0). All equations include time and industry dummies 
    entire  period  bad  times     entire  period 
  marginal coef. std  err marginal coef. std err   marginal  coef. std err
sizeit-1 0.01 0,04 0,02 **  0.02 0.05 0.03 *  0,01 0,03 0,02 ** 
bank debt/Ait-1 -0.38 -0,97 0,11 ***  -0.49 -1.27 0.23 ***  -0,35 -0,90 0,12 *** 
credit lines/Ait-1 0.21 0,53 0,10 ***  0.27 0.69 0.22 ***  0,19 0,48 0,12 *** 
CFit-1/Ait-1 -0.22 -0,57 0,23 ***  -0.55 -1.42 0.44 ***  -0,17 -0,45 0,27 * 
D1 -0.06 -0,15 0,05 ***  -0.08 -0.22 0.09 **  -0,05 -0,14 0,05 *** 
Dbad*sizeit-1     0,01 0,01 0,01 ** 
Dbad*bank debt/Ait-1     -0,10 -0,26 0,25
Dbad*credit lines/Ait-1     0,08 0,20 0,24
Dbad*CFit-1/Ait-1     -0,29 -0,74 0,48
Dbad*D1     -0,02 -0,05 0,10
Log  L   -4017 -931    -4013
#  obs   5956 1408    5956
D1 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm has a single bank relationship     
Dbad is a dummy that is equal to 1 when ∆(CF/K) is below the first quartile   
marginal : Marginal effects are computed for firms with multiple bank relationship in 2002 in the food industry 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level         
 
  Our first regression shows that over all periods (both normal and bad times), the probability of 
obtaining extra bank debt is higher for larger firms with lower bank debt over assets ratio, higher 
credit lines, confirming the earlier results. In addition, the probability of obtaining extra bank debt 
is higher for firms with lower cash flow. Also firms with a single bank relationship have a lower 
probability to obtain bank credit. This is consistent with the evidence given in Table 1 that for firms 
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lower bank debt in percentage of their total assets). This contrasts with the finding of Cole (1998) 
that firms with multiple sources of financial services have a lower probability of receiving credit.  
  In the second regression the results indicate that during adverse cash flow shocks period, the 
same results hold. Large firms with low leverage and higher credit lines are more likely to obtain 
credit.  Although it is possible that firms that are larger and have less bank credit endogenously 
demand more credit in normal times and during adverse cash flow shocks, a more likely 
interpretation is that in general, banks are more willing to extend their credit to firms that are larger 
and that are not too highly bank indebted. Finally, firms with a single bank relationship have a 
lower probability of obtaining extra bank debt in bad times, controlling for size and initial liquidity.  
  In principle times of adverse cash flow shocks should be times where extra credit is demanded. 
A priori the increase in demand should not be different for single bank and multiple bank 
relationship firms. If single bank relationship firms are better shielded from adverse cash flow 
shocks by their bank than multiple bank relationship firms, one should expect that the probability 
of obtaining extra bank debt for single bank relationship firms to go up during adverse cash flow 
shocks. We test whether the probability changes  during times of adverse cash flow shocks 
compared to normal times. Our findings are in column (3). The only factor that significantly 
increases the probability of obtaining extra credit in bad times versus normal times is size. Larger 
firms are more likely to obtain extra credit. We interpret this as consistent with larger firms facing 
less asymmetric information problems during adverse cash flow shocks. Single bank relationship 
firms do not show a different probability of obtaining credit during times of adverse cash flow 




  This paper examines how firms do adjust their investment and financing in periods of adverse 
liquidity shocks, and whether having a single versus multiple bank relationships influences 
investment and financing outcomes. We analyse these questions for a sample of medium and large 
firms over the period 1997-2002.  
  Our results may be summarised as follows. First, interpreting differences in the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment as differences in the degree of financial constraints (following Fazzari et 
al, 1988), we identify periods where financial constraints become binding as periods of large 
negative cash flow shocks. We find that the number of bank relationships does not influence the 
degree of financial constraints the firm faces.  
  Second, we provide evidence that, in some case, firms may compensate for this thanks to 
increased lending from their creditors. In particular, firms that benefit from additional bank credit 
reduce their investment spending by a much lower extent. However, in some other cases, the 
negative effect of these events on firm’s investment is reinforced when lenders cut their credit to 
firms. This forces firms to reduce their investment spending strongly. The number of bank 
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additional credit.  
  Third, our Probit regressions suggest that the probability of obtaining extra bank debt is higher 
for larger firms, for firms with lower bank debt to assets ratio and for firms that can rely on several 
banks. In case of adverse liquidity shocks, the probability of obtaining extra bank debt is lower, and 
banks may be more reluctant to provide additional credit to smaller and more levered firms, but 
having a single bank does not modify the probability of obtaining extra bank debt as compared to 
normal business fluctuations. 
  All in all, we find no strong evidence that the number of bank relationships influence 
investment and financing decisions. Having a single bank relationship does not affect the degree of 
financial constraints. Investment behaviour is identical for firms with a single bank and firms with 
multiple bank relationships. This holds in normal times as well as in periods of adverse liquidity 
shocks. Having a single bank relationship reduces the probability of obtaining increases in bank 
credit, but the probability for single bank firms is not lower in bad times When financial constraints 
bind, in periods of adverse liquidity shocks, they obtain the same amount of bank debt as firms 
with multiple bank relationships (conditional on the probability of obtaining extra bank credit). In 
addition, they may turn to trade debt. In case of adverse liquidity shocks, what really impedes 
investment in these periods is when firms cumulate a drop in cash flow and a contraction of 
external bank credit. The second depends more on the size and initial leverage of the firm than on 
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 Data appendix 
 
  The main variables of our analysis are defined as follow. Output is defined by turnover. Cash 
flow is defined as the sum of net profits, depreciation, changes in investment grants, changes in 
provisions and deferred taxes, amounts written off on stocks and contracts on progress and on trade 
debt, and adjusted for relevant financial charges. We use value added and investment prices to 
obtain real series.  
  For the construction of the capital stock, we distinguish between five different types of capital 
goods: (1) land and buildings, (2) plant and machinery, (3) furniture and motor vehicles, (4) 
leasing, and (5) other. For each of these capital goods and each sector we construct the capital stock 
in the following way. We use the perpetual inventory method to construct the real capital stock, 
i.e.: 
 
  t K =  1 - t K .(1-δ) + pt.It/pt
 
We use the industry-specific price index of investment goods provided by the National Accounts, 
in which. the price index at 1995 is equal to one. Nominal investment is the sum of several factors, 
each of which is deflated by the investment price index of the time at which the investment was 
made. In particular, the acquisition of tangible assets in the current year is deflated by current 
prices, but sales and the disposal of old capital are deflated by the prices related to the age of this 
capital.17 The initial nominal capital stock at historical prices in t is equal to the sum of all 
acquisitions of new capital minus (accumulated) depreciation over the entire history of the firm up 
to t-1. The real initial capital stock is obtained by deflating the initial nominal capital stock with 
investment prices related to the age of the capital stock.18 We construct depreciation rates by sector 
and type of capital good, based on the lifetimes of the capital goods reported in the National 
Accounts. 
  We define bank relationship across the range of all bank products.. Firm i has a relationship 
with bank j in period t, if bank j provides credit or short-term facilities or collateral to firm I in year 
t. Developing a bank relationship through some bank products may facilitate access to (long-term) 
credit when necessary. In addition, although the natural way to finance fixed investment is through 
long-term debt or equity issues, it appears that some firms have no long-term debt at all, and 
finance their investment through other sources. This is another reason to consider a broader range 
of products that long-term credit alone. We therefore think the relevant definition of bank 
relationship should cover all types of bank products, long-term credit, short-term credit, credit 
lines, collateral, ….  
                                                      
17   The average age of sold and used capital is estimated from the annual accounts information on depreciation. Details 
will be provided by the authors on request. 
18   This is again inferred from annual accounts information on depreciation.  
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July 2006  The data is trimmed as follow. We focus on profit maximising firms, that is we exclude foreign 
and public companies and non-profit associations. We consider only annual accounts going from 
January to December in order to ensure consistency with price indexes (constructed over the entire 
year) and consistency between units19. We also exclude a couple of observations that concerned 
firms that lose a bank relationship due to a bank merger; this concerns only 1% of the original 
sample. I/K, CF/K, ∆y Y/K and financial ratios are trimmed by P5-P95 year by year. For estimation 
purposes, we retain only firms that exist for at least 7 consecutive years  
 
Determinants of the probability of a single vs. multiple bank relationship 
 
Table A.1. reports the Maximum Likelihood estimates of a Probit model for having a single .  
multiple bank relationships. The first column reports the estimates with time dummies and no 
random effects. The second takes into account individual heterogeneity by including random 
effects. The results show that firms that are larger and with less cash flow tend to have multiple 
bank relationships rather than a single one. They are also characterised by higher bank credit over 
total assets, both in the form of bank debt and in the form of credit lines. 
 
Table A.1: Probit model for multiple bank relationships                                                           
Dependent variable:D(> 1 banks)  7207observations. All equations include time dummies 
  no random effects                              with random effects υi~N(0,συ²)            
 coef  std p-value   coef std p-value   
Iit-1/Kit-1 -0.31 0.10 0.00 ***  -0.39 0.27 0.16   
sizeit 0.47 0.04 0.00 ***  0.45 0.00 0.00  *** 
CFit/Kit-1 -0.30 0.05 0.00 ***  -0.58 0.16 0.00  *** 
credit linesit/Kit-1 0.22 0.03 0.00 ***  0.67 0.33 0.04  ** 
bank debt/assetsit 0.50 0.20 0.01 ***  0.36 0.45 0.43   
συ²     16.29 0.45 0.00  *** 
Log L  -3445.06    -2121.15    
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level         
 
Predictive power of cash flow for future sales growth 
 
  Table A.2. below reports simple forecasting models for future sales growth, along the lines of 
Bond et al. (2003). The aim is to test whether our finding of a positive cash flow coefficient in the 
investment equation (1) is due to cash flow proxying for future profits rather than to financial 
constraints. We estimate an autoregressive model for sales growth, through least squares with time 
                                                      
19   In some cases annual accounts refer to only a part of the year (for seasonal activities for example). In some other 
case, the period covered is spanned over several years. For instance in 1997 a firm reports for the period August 
1996 to July 1997.If, for the future she wants to report for the period from January to December. Then in 1998, she 
will report from August 1997 to December 1998.  
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There is no robust evidence that cash flow is predictor of future sales growth. This suggests that we 
may be confident on our interpretation that an excessive sensitivity of investment to cash flow is an 
indication of financial constraints. 
 
Table A.2: Predictive power of cash flow for future sales growth    
Dependent variable:∆y.. All equations include time dummies     
  LS with time and 
industry dummies 
LS with time and 
industry dummies 
SGMM estimation  SGMM estimation 
Parameter coef.  std  err    coef. std err coef. std err    coef. std err
C 0.051  11.91  ***  0.061 7.24 ***  0.050 10.12  ***  0.037 4.12 *** 
Iit-1/Kit-2 0.060 5.24  ***  0.046 4.11 ***  0.016 1.21    0.019 1.08
Iit-2/Kit-3      0.036 3.60 ***     0.017 1.06
∆yit-1 -0.010 -0.65    -0.060 -3.86 ***  -0.068 -3.38  ***  -0.076 -2.87 *** 
∆yit-2      0.001 0.06    -0.025 -1.03
CFit-1/Kit-2 -0.008 -1.70  *  0.001 0.14 0.017 1.56    0.033 1.44
CFit-2/Kit-3      -0.004 -0.59     0.029 2.21 ** 
      p-value    p-value 
Sargan       39.739 0.04    30.252 0.14
m1      -20.321 0.00    -19.587 0.00
m2      -1.970 0.05    -1.510 0.13
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level      
  
 
Determinants of the probability of going from a single to multiple bank relationship 
 
Table A.3. reports the Maximum Likelihood estimates of a Probit model for having a single vs.  
multiple bank relationships. The first column reports the estimates with time dummies and no 
random effects. The second takes into account individual heterogeneity by including random 
effects. The results show that are larger and with less cash flow tend to have multiple bank  
relationships rather than a single one. They are also characterised by higher bank credit over total  
assets, both in the form of bank debt and in the form of credit lines. 
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Dependent variable:D(> 1 banks)  7207observations. All equations include time dummies 
  no random effects         no random effects         with random effects 
υi~N(0,συ²)                  
with random effects 
υi~N(0,συ²)                  
Parameter coef.  std  err   coef. std err   coef. std err   coef.  std err  
∆yit 0.53 0.24  **  0.62 0.24 ***  0.53 0.24 **  0.62 0.24 ***
∆(CFit/Kit-1) -0.32 0.10  ***  -0.15 0.12   -0.32 0.10 ***  -0.15 0.12
Iit-1/Kit-1 0.44 0.14  ***  0.40 0.14 ***  0.44 0.14 ***  0.40 0.14 ***
sizeit-1 -0.16 0.03  ***  -0.16 0.03 ***  -0.16 0.03 ***  -0.16 0.03 ***
Dbad      0.24 0.08 ***   0.24  0.08 ***
Log L  -862.9     -858.1  0.00 0.00 ***  0.00  0.00 ***
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level         
 
Estimates of the probit model for the probability of an increase in bank debt, with random effects 
 
  Table A.4. reports the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the Probit model of section VI, with 
time dummies and random effects. The coefficients are of the same order of magnitude as in Table 
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July 2006Table A.4: Probability of obtaining extra bank debt in normal times and during periods 
of adverse cash flow shocks 
Dependent variable: D(∆bank>0) 1408 observations. Probit model with time dummies and 
random effects υi ~N(0,συ²) 
  adverse cash flow 
shocks 
normal times    
  coef.  std err coef. std err coef. std err   
sizeit-1 0.07 0.03 **  0.04 0.02 **  0,03 0,02  * 
bank debt/Ait-1 -1.28 0.26 ***  -1.36 0.14 ***  -1,27 0,15  *** 
credit lines/Ait-1 0.74 0.23 ***  0.64 0.12 ***  0,60 0,13  *** 
CFit-1/Ait-1 -1.26 0.44 ***  -0.60 0.25 **  -0,45 0,30   
D1 -0.21 0.10 **  -0.18 0.05 ***  -0,17 0,06  *** 
Dbad*sizeit-1   0,01 0,01  ** 
Dbad*bank debt/Ait-1   -0,36 0,27   
Dbad*credit lines/Ait-1   0,18 0,26   
Dbad*CFit-1/Ait-1   -0,67 0,51   
Dbad*D1   -0,08 0,11  
συ²  0.12 0.10 0.18 0.03 ***  0,18 0,03  *** 
Log L  -942  -4001 -3997    
# obs  1408  5956 5956    
D1 is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm has a single bank relationship   
Dbad is a dummy that is equal to 1 when ∆(CF/K) is below the first quartile   
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